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D
uringthelastseveralyears,concernhas
increased that changes in the financial
system have made it harder for rural
banks to attract enough deposits to meet local
creditdemands.Whileurbanbanksmayfacesome
of the same problems, it is widely believed that
fundingpressureshaveincreasedmoreforrural
banks than for urban banks. In response, bank
trade groups and rural development officials
have proposed new measures to expand rural







minimum and that banks will be reluctant to
make additional loans without receiving addi-
tionaldeposits.Second,ruraldepositgrowthhas
beensluggish.Ruralbankersattributethisslug-







but make few loans to local borrowers, forcing
remainingruralbankstomeetabiggershareofthe
community’s credit needs with an unchanged
supply of funds.
This article examines recent loan and deposit
trends in Tenth District states to see what evi-
dence exists for each of the three sources of
concern about rural funding pressures and to
see if the concerns are more justified for rural
banks than urban banks. Overall, the evidence
indicates that sluggish deposit growth has
increased funding pressures at rural banks but
not any more than at urban banks of the same
size. In short, increased funding pressures
appear to be a small-bank problem rather than
just a rural problem. This finding is tempered,
however,bytwoimportantcaveats.First,funding
pressures could become more severe at rural
banks than urban banks if rural investors begin
investing as much of their wealth in mutual
funds as urban investors do. Second, small-
bank funding pressures are likely to have a big-
ger impact on rural borrowers because small
William R. Keeton is a senior economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City.businesses in rural areas are more dependent on
small banks for loans than small businesses in
urban areas.
The first section of the article focuses on the
concern about rising loan-deposit ratios, the
second section on the concern about sluggish
deposit growth, and the third section on the
concernabouttakeoversofruralbanks.Thelast
sectionsummarizestheevidenceandbrieflydis-
cusses the policy implications.
I. THE RISE IN LOAN-DEPOSIT
RATIOS AT RURAL BANKS
The first concern about rural funding pres-
suresisthattheloan-depositratiosofruralbanks
have been rising sharply the last several years.
Some analysts argue that a high loan-deposit
ratiosignificantlyincreasestherisktoabankof
suffering a liquidity crisis. Thus, as the loan-
deposit rises, rural banks may become increas-
inglyreluctanttomakeadditionalloans,leaving
some local credit needs unsatisfied. Other ana-
lysts dispute that the increase in loan-deposit
ratiosisasignofseverefundingpressures,arguing
thattheriskofilliquidityistoosmalltodiscour-
age rural banks from making additional loans.
What are the issues?
Theconcernabouttherisingloan-depositratio
of rural banks is based on the idea that rural
banks must worry about the risk of illiquidity
because their small size makes it difficult for
them to borrow on the open market. Most bank
loans cannot be liquidated quickly. Thus, if a
bank’s depositors make unanticipated deposit
withdrawals or if its loan customers unexpect-
edly draw down their lines of credit, the bank
willeitherhavetosellsomeofitssecurityhold-
ingsorborrowontheopenmarket.Thehighera
bank’s loan-deposit ratio, the lower its cushion
of security holdings will be, and the greater the
likelihoodthatithastoborrowontheopenmarket





quidity will go up, making the bank reluctant to
extendnewloanswithoutreceivingnewdeposits.
Recent empirical studies on the impact of
monetary policy on bank lending support the
viewthatahighloan-depositratioconstrainsthe
amount of credit extended by small banks. One
studythatexaminedbanklendingbehaviorfrom
1976 to 1992 found that changes in monetary
policyhadasignificantlybiggerimpactonlend-
ing by small banks than on lending by large
banks,consistentwiththeviewthatsmallbanks
cannotborroweasilyontheopenmarketandare
constrained in their lending by the amount of
deposits they can attract (Kashyap and Stein
1995). A follow-up study by the same authors
found that, among small banks, changes in mone-
tary policy led to bigger changes in lending at
bankswithlowratiosofsecuritiestoassetsthan
at banks with high ratios of securities to assets
(Kashyap and Stein 1997). This result suggests
notonlythatdepositsactasaconstraintonlending
at small banks, but that the constraint becomes
more binding as the loan-deposit ratio rises.
Rural bankers claim their loan-deposit ratios
have risen to the point where the supply of
deposits is now acting as a severe constraint on
their lending. They argue that further decreases
in security holdings would impose too great a
riskofilliquidity,andthatborrowingontheopen
market is too expensive and too unreliable to
serveasasourceofloanablefunds.Accordingto
this view, the increase in loan-deposit ratios at
rural banks justifies some form of government
intervention to expand rural banks’ access to
loanable funds (American Bankers Association).
Some analysts disagree that the increase in
loan-deposit ratios is a cause for concern.
According to these analysts, it is typical for
loan-deposit ratios to increase during a cyclical
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steeper than normal, it is only because loan-
deposit ratios were severely depressed in the
1980s. Rural areas have shared in the current
economic expansion. During such periods, the
expected return on loans tends to increase rela-
tive to that on securities, encouraging banks to
shiftoutofsecuritiesintoloans(Wood).Further-
more, the loan-deposit ratio at rural banks
started out at an unusually low level in the early
1990s. Heavy loan losses and pressure from
regulators caused many rural banks to become
highlycautiousinthe1980s,avoidingallbutthe
safest loans. At the same time, increased bank-
ruptcies and loan defaults caused many rural
farmsandbusinessestoavoiddebtaltogetherand
restructure their balance sheets. To the extent




These analysts also argue that recent changes
in financial markets mean that a high loan-
deposit ratio has less severe implications for
liquidity than in the past (U. S. Department of
Agriculture). Rural banks enjoy greater access
tonondepositfundsnowthantheydidinthelate
1970s, the last time the loan-deposit ratio was




the late 1970s. Rural bank loan portfolios are
also more liquid than in the past. Specifically,
rural banks hold a smaller percentage of farm
and business loans and a higher percentage of
home mortgages, which can be sold readily on
the secondary market.
Finally, even if high loan-deposit ratios are
creating funding pressures, it could be argued
thatthesepressuresarenotuniquetoruralbanks
andthusdonotjustifyremedialpoliciestargeted
at rural banks. If high loan-deposit ratios dis-
courageruralbanksfrommakingnewloans,itis
because their small size makes it difficult for
themtoborrowontheopenmarket,notbecause
they are located in rural markets. Small urban
banksfacethesamedifficultyborrowingonthe
open market. Thus, to the extent their loan-
deposit ratios have risen, they could be facing
the same funding pressures as rural banks.
How much have rural loan-deposit ratios
increased?





larger a bank, the greater its access to capital
marketswillbeandthemoreeasilyitwillbeable
toborrowintheeventofaliquiditycrisis.Thus,
within any market, the loan-deposit ratio will
typically increase with the size of the bank.
Ruralbanksarepredominantlysmall.Toensure
that differences between the loan-deposit ratios
of rural and urban banks do not reflect differ-
encesinthesizedistributionofbanksinthetwo
types of market, Chart 1 compares rural banks
with urban banks of similar size. Specifically,
the urban loan-deposit ratio is computed as a
weighted average of the loan-deposit ratio in
three different size groups, using as weights the
proportion of rural bank deposits in each size
group.
2
Chart 1 provides mixed evidence on funding
pressures at rural banks. In support of the view
that rural banks face significant funding pres-
sures,thechartshowsthattheruralloan-deposit
ratio has risen sharply during the last several
years and is high by historical standards. From
1992 to 1997, the ratio increased 14 percentage
pointstojustover69percent.Thatratiowasthe
highest on record, exceeding the previous peak
in 1979 by a couple of percentage points.
Lookedatfromanotherperspective,however,
the chart suggests that the funding pressures
rural banks face today may not be so unusual.
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only slightly higher than in 1979, when rural




ing explaining why the recent increase looks so
steep. Finally, the rural loan-deposit ratio has
alsoincreasedsharplyinothereconomicexpan-
sions, most notably the one from 1975 to 1979,
when the ratio rose 10 percentage points.
While the recent increase in the rural loan-
depositratiocanbeinterpretedindifferentways,
Chart 1 provides strong evidence that funding
pressures have not increased any more at rural
banks than at similar-size urban banks. The
loan-deposit ratios of rural and urban banks
moved closely together in the 1960s and 1970s.




also turned downward, and by the early 1990s,
the gap between the two ratios had narrowed
considerably.Sincethen,theurbanloan-deposit
ratio has risen almost as much as the rural loan-
deposit ratio, increasing 12 percentage points
from mid-1992 to mid-1997. The urban loan-
deposit ratio also continues to exceed the rural
loan-depositratio,thoughbyonlyasmallmargin.
Another source of evidence casting some doubt
on the severity of funding pressures at rural
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Chart 1
LOAN-DEPOSIT RATIO
Tenth District states, midyear
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dotted line, however, banks participating in the
survey give little indication of being uncomfort-
ablewiththeirhigh-loandepositratios.Asmight
be expected, the net percentage of banks saying
theywouldpreferahigherloan-depositratiohas
declinedmarkedlysincethelate1980s.Surpris-
ingly, however, the proportion of banks prefer-
ring a higher loan-deposit ratio still exceeds the
proportion preferring a lower loan-deposit ratio
by a significant margin—23 percentage points
in the fourth quarter of 1997. This experience
stands in sharp contrast to the late 1970s, when
theloan-depositratiowasalmostashighandthe
net percentage of banks preferring a higher loan-
deposit ratio was negative.
3
Thoseanalystswhobelieveruralbanksdonot
face significant funding pressures would argue
that the more relaxed attitude of survey respon-
dents to high loan-deposit ratios is a sign that
ruralbanksarenotasconstrainedbysuchratios
astheyusedtobe.Thesurveyresultsmustbeinter-
preted with caution, however, because respon-
dentsarenotaskedaboutthetermsatwhichthey
would be willing to make additional loans. The
banks that say they would prefer a higher loan-
deposit ratio might insist that any additional
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Chart 2
LOAN-DEPOSIT RATIO AT TENTH DISTRICT FARM BANKS
Fourth quarter
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Agricultural Credit Survey.
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‘80 ‘88 ‘96loans funded from nondeposit sources earn
higher returns to compensate for the increased
risk of illiquidity. If so, the high loan-deposit
ratios at these banks could still act as a signifi-
cant constraint on their lending.
To summarize, the evidence on loan-deposit
ratios is mixed. On the one hand, loan-deposit
ratioshaverisensharplyatruralbanksinrecent
years. But on the other hand, some of the increase
inloan-depositratiosappearstobecyclical,and
some of the increase represents a return to normal
levelsafterthesevereslumpinrurallendingin
the1980s.Also,surveyevidencesuggeststhatrural
banks are not as uncomfortable with high loan-
depositratiosnowastheywereinthelate1970s.
To the extent that the higher loan-deposit ratios
dosignalanincreaseinfundingpressures,those
pressures would appear to be no more severe at
rural banks than at small urban banks. It is





in rural markets are served primarily by small
banks, whereas small businesses in urban mar-
kets are served by a combination of small and
large banks. Small businesses in urban markets




not get a loan at a small bank because the bank
hasahighloan-depositratiomaybeabletoobtaina
loan from a larger bank or a nonbank financial
institution. A small rural business may not have
these options—-first, because other banks in the
communityprobablyfacefundingpressuresjust
as severe as the bank that turned down the loan,
andsecond,becausethenonbankfinancialinsti-
tutionsthatlendtosmallbusinessesoftendonot
serve rural markets. Thus, if high loan-deposit
ratiosconstrainlendingatsmallbanks,creditto
small businesses is more likely to be reduced in
rural markets than urban markets.
II. THE SLUGGISHNESS IN RURAL
DEPOSIT GROWTH
A second source of concern about funding
pressuresatruralbanksisthatdepositgrowthin
rural markets has been sluggish. Some analysts
argue that the increased popularity of mutual
fundsandtheagingoftheruralpopulationhave
reduced rural deposit growth without slowing
growthinruralcreditdemands.Asaresult,rural
banksarefindingitincreasinglydifficulttofund
their loans. Other analysts acknowledge that
ruraldepositgrowthhasbeensluggishbutargue
that much of the sluggishness has been due to
weakeconomicgrowthandtheone-timeimpact
of the thrift crisis. Such factors would tend to
reducetheneedfordepositstofinanceloansand
investments,leavingfundingpressuresunchanged.
What are the issues?
Analystsconcernedaboutthesluggishgrowth
inruraldepositspointfirsttotheincreasedpopu-
larity of mutual funds. Shares in mutual funds
areviewedasclosesubstitutesforbankandthrift
deposits because they pay open market returns,
are easy to purchase and liquidate, and in some
cases provide check-writing privileges. In the
1980s, most of the mutual fund competition
camefrommoneymarketfunds.Morerecently,
however,depositshavefacedincreasingcompe-




for retirement and therefore most willing to
make investments with high short-term risk but
high long-term returns (Morgan). Stock and
bond funds also benefited from an increased
willingness of people in the 35-55 age group to
invest in mutual funds (Laderman). As doubts
arose about the health of social security, these
individuals became more concerned about sav-
ing for retirement. And as the runup in stock
prices persisted, they became more inclined to
view stocks as good long-term investments.
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fundshasoccurredinallmarkets,someanalysts
argue that two special factors have caused
investorstoshiftoutofruraldepositsevenfaster
than urban deposits the last several years. The
first factor these analysts cite is increased
access by rural investors to mutual fund products.
Accordingtothisargument,brokeragefirmsand
mutualfundcompaniesinitiallyignoredruralmar-




on rural investors, causing a delayed shift by
those investors out of deposits (Duncan).
Thesecondfactorthatisclaimedtobeslowing
rural deposit growth more than urban growth is
the aging of the rural population. As the young
have migrated to cities, many rural counties
have been left with a high proportion of elderly
residents. In Tenth District states, 15 percent of
theruralpopulationwas65orolderin1996,versus
11percentoftheurbanpopulation.Moreover,
in a quarter of rural counties in the district, the
proportionofelderlyexceeded20percent.Some
of these older rural residents are wealthy inves-
torswhoholdmostoftheirfundsinlocalbanks.
Astheseinvestorsdieandpasstheirestatesonto
children in distant cities, rural deposits decline
becausetheheirsprefertoinvestthefundsinother
ways—forexample,inmutualfundsordeposits




reflected economic stagnation in rural areas.
Many rural counties have enjoyed only modest
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, as fam-
ily farms have become less profitable and resi-
dentshavemovedtocitiestoseekhigherpaying
jobs. If most of the recent sluggishness in rural
depositgrowthwereduetosucheconomicstag-
nation, there would be little reason to worry
about a fundamental shift in preferences among
rural investors away from deposits toward
mutual funds and other financial instruments.
And there would be little reason to worry about
funding pressures at rural banks, because the
same economic slowdown that reduced rural
depositgrowthcouldalsobeexpectedtoreduce
rural loan demand.




talized thrifts gambled and lost on risky real
estate investments, plunging them into insol-
vency. When these thrifts were finally closed in
the first half of the 1990s, some of their assets
weretakenoverbyhealthybanksandthriftsbut
most were liquidated by regulators. Further-
more,healthythriftswererequiredtopayhigher
insurance premiums to rebuild the thrift insur-
ance fund, reducing their profits and slowing
their asset growth. Some banks took advantage




fund bank and thrift assets (Duca). If this effect
accounted for most of the sluggishness in rural
deposit growth, there would be little reason to
worryaboutashiftininvestorpreferencesaway
from deposits, and thus little reason to worry
aboutincreasedfundingpressuresatruralbanks.
How sluggish has rural deposit growth
been?
Every June, banks and thrifts file reports with
regulators indicating the amount of deposits
heldateachoffice.Sincethedataarereportedat
the branch level, they can be used to measure
totaldepositsheldinruralandurbanareas.This
deposit measure is not perfect because the
depositsbookedataparticularofficemaybecol-
lectedatanentirelydifferentlocation.Forexam-
ple, large multistate banking organizations
sometimes shift deposits and loans from banks
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with low tax rates, thereby reducing their total
tax burden. And even smaller banks some-
times use deposit brokers to attract large time
deposits from investors in other parts of the
country. Despite these shortcomings, however,
most banking analysts believe deposits booked
at local branches provide a reasonably good
measureofdepositsheldbylocalbusinessesand
households.
Chart 3 shows annual deposit growth in rural
and urban markets from 1980 to 1997, the last
yearforwhichdataareavailable.Ruraldeposits
consist of total deposits at rural offices, includ-
ing not only the local offices of rural banks and
thriftsbutalsotheruralbranchesofurbanbanks
and thrifts. Similarly, urban deposits consist of
totaldepositsaturbanoffices,mostofwhichare
headofficesorbranchesofurbaninstitutionsbut
a few of which are branches of rural banks and
thrifts. Both deposit measures are expressed in
constant 1997 dollars to control for inflation.
5
The chart confirms that rural deposit growth
has been quite sluggish since the early 1980s.





continued to fall about 2 percent per year until
theearly1990s,whentherateofdeclinebeganto
moderate. Deposit growth did not rise above
zero until 1996, however. During that year and
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Chart 3
REAL DEPOSIT GROWTH
Commercial banks and thrifts in Tenth District states*














a significant improvement over the previous
decade but well below the growth rates attained
during the boom of the early 1980s.
Chart3alsoshows,however,thatruraldeposit
growth has not been any weaker than urban
deposit growth over the period. During some
years, such as the mid-to-late 1980s, deposit
growth was noticeably weaker in rural markets
than urban markets. But in other years, such as
theearly1980sandearly1990s,depositgrowth
was noticeably stronger in rural markets than
urban markets. During the last four years, more-
over, deposit growth has been remarkably similar
in rural and urban markets. Urban deposit
growth did rise somewhat above rural deposit
growthin1997.Thegapwasonly1.4percentage
point, however, too small a difference to con-
clude that the two growth rates have begun to
diverge.Thus,thechartprovideslittlesupport
for the view that increased access of rural
investors to mutual fund products and the
agingoftheruralpopulationhavecausedrural
deposit growth to slow more than urban
deposit growth in recent years.
Was the sluggishness due to weak
economic growth?
As noted earlier, the sluggishness in rural
depositgrowthwouldnotincreasefundingpres-
sures at rural banks if it were due to weak eco-
nomic growth. Table 1 suggests, however, that
the sluggish growth in rural deposits since the
early 1980s can be explained in only small part
by weak economic growth. The table shows
average annual growth in real deposits and real
personal income for successive five-year peri-
ods and the last three years. As the boom in the
agriculture and energy gave way to a severe
slump, rural income growth slowed in the sec-
ondhalfofthe1980s,accountingforsomeofthe
slowdown in deposit growth during that period.
Deposit growth declined almost three percent-
age points more than income growth, however,
suggesting that the slower deposit growth was
not just a normal response to slower economic
growth. In the first half of the 1990s, it is even
more evident that sluggish deposit growth was
not due to weak economic growth. During that
period,incomegrowthreboundedwhiledeposit
growth slowed even further. By 1995, deposit
growth and income growth were again moving
in the same direction. Deposit growth remained
well below income growth, however, in sharp
contrast to the first half of the 1980s.
WhileTable1confirmsthatruraldepositgrowth
has been sluggish, it provides even less support
thanChart3fortheviewthatincreasedaccessof
rural investors to mutual funds and the aging of
the rural population have caused rural deposit
growthtoslowmorethanurbandepositgrowth.
In the second half of the 1980s, deposit growth
slowed more than income growth in urban mar-
kets,justasitdidinruralmarkets.Asaresult,the
gap between urban deposit growth and urban
income growth widened to two percentage
points,somewhatmorethaninruralmarkets.In
the first half of the 1990s, urban income growth
improved somewhat, but urban deposit growth
plummeted.Asaresult,thegapbetweendeposit
growth and income growth in urban markets
increased to almost six percentage points, sig-
nificantly more than in rural markets. The pic-
ture was little changed in 1995 and 1996, when
deposits grew slower than income in both types
of markets but especially in urban markets.
The claim that rural deposit growth has not
been any more sluggish than urban deposit
growth after controlling for income growth can
be tested more rigorously through regression
analysis. For this purpose, the district was
dividedinto31ruralmarketsand25urbanmar-
kets.
7 For each subperiod, a regression equation
was estimated for all 56 markets using average
annualincomegrowthtoexplainaverageannual
deposit growth. From this equation, an estimate
wasthenderivedofthedifferencebetweenrural
and urban deposit growth after controlling for
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showstheestimatedeffectofincomegrowthon
depositgrowthineachsubperiod,whilethesec-
ond column shows the estimated difference
between rural and urban deposit growth after
controlling for income growth. The table also
indicates whether the estimates are statistically
significant, in the sense of being too large to be
attributed to chance.
8
The results confirm that rural deposit growth
has been stronger than urban deposit growth
after controlling for income growth. Specifi-
cally, the second column of the table indicates
thatruraldepositgrowthexceededurbandeposit
growth by 1.9 percentage points per year in the
firsthalfofthe1980s,1.7percentagepointsper
yearinthesecondhalfofthe1980s,and1.3per-
centage points per year in the first half of the
1990s. In all three subperiods, the difference in
growthrateswasstatisticallysignificant,though
somewhat less in the first half of the 1990s than
the earlier subperiods.
Was the sluggishness due to the thrift
crisis?
The other factor that could have depressed
ruraldepositgrowthwithoutincreasingfunding
pressures at rural banks was the thrift crisis.
Frommid-1989tomid-1994,districtthriftslost
atotalof$14billioninruraldeposits—$11billion
at insolvent thrifts and $3 billion at healthy
thrifts(Table3).Abouthalfthetotaldepositslost
by thrifts during these years were acquired by
the banking industry through deposit transfers,
mergers, and branch purchases.
9 Applying that
proportion to the $14 billion loss in thrift deposits
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Table 1
REAL DEPOSIT AND INCOME GROWTH
IN RURAL VS. URBAN MARKETS
Tenth District states
(average annual percent change)









1979-84 2.3 .7 1.6 1.6 1.9 -.3
1984-89 -2.0 -.7 -1.3 -.8 1.3 -2.1
1989-94 -2.7 1.0 -3.7 -4.0 1.8 -5.8
1995 -.7 1.8 -2.5 -.7 4.1 -4.8
1996 1.3 3.6 -2.3 .5 3.1 -2.6
1997 1.2 — — 2.6 — —
Note: Deposit growth is for midyear bank and thrift deposits expressed in 1997 dollars. Income growth is for annual
personal income expressed in 1997 dollars. Data exclude Casper, Wyoming, and Ottawa, Kansas (see text).
Source: Summary of Deposits, U.S. Department of Commerce.in rural markets would suggest a net decline in
rural deposits due to the thrift crisis of $7 bil-
lion—alittlemorethan7percentoftotaldepos-
its at the start of the period. This figure could
either overstate or understate the true effect of
thethriftcrisis,however.Ontheonehand,some
ofthedepositsthatwerepaidoffbyregulatorsor
voluntarily withdrawn from failing and healthy
thrifts may have been reinvested in rural banks.
Inotherwords,partofthe$14billioninlostthrift
depositsmayhavebeenacquiredbyruralbanks
indirectly, resulting in a net deposit loss below
$7 billion. On the other hand, some of the thrift
depositsacquiredbyruralbanksmayhavebeen
used to replace other deposits rather than
increaseloansandinvestments.Inthatcase,the




sis on rural deposit growth more precisely is to
compare deposit growth in rural markets where
thrifts were important with deposit growth in
ruralmarketswherethriftswereunimportant.If
the net effect of the thrift crisis was to reduce
rural deposit growth, the rural markets with the
lowest deposit growth should be those with the
largest amounts of thrift deposits at the start of
the period—especially deposits in soon-to-fail
thrifts. In this case, multiplying total rural thrift
deposits by the estimated effect of local thrift
depositsonlocaldepositgrowthshouldprovide
a reasonable estimate of the impact of the thrift
crisis on rural deposit growth.
This approach leads to the conclusion that the




the extent to which 1989-94 deposit growth
dependedon1989-94incomegrowth,thepercent
of1989depositsininsolventthrifts,andtheper-
cent of 1989 deposits in healthy thrifts. The
regression estimates imply that rural markets
lost 72 cents of deposits for every dollar of
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Table 2
ESTIMATED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RURAL
AND URBAN DEPOSIT GROWTH









*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
Note:Sampleconsistsof25MSAsand31ruraleconomicareasinTenthDistrictstates,witheachareagivenequalweight.depositsheldinsoon-to-failthrifts,and32cents
for every dollar of deposits held in healthy
thrifts.
11Applyingtheseestimatestothedeposit
shares shown in Table 3 indicates that the thrift
crisis reduced rural deposits by 12.6 percent over
the five-year period, compared to an actual
decline in rural deposits of 12.9 percent. Thus,
the estimates suggest that without the thrift cri-
sis,ruraldepositgrowthwouldnothavebeenas
weakbutstillwouldhavebeenslightlynegative.
The thrift crisis also helps explain why rural
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Table 3
REAL RURAL AND URBAN DEPOSITS BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION
Tenth District states
Rural markets Urban markets
1989 1994 1997 1989 1994 1997
Deposits
(billions of 1997 dollars)
Thrifts 24.4 10.8 9.4 59.5 26.1 24.6
Soon-to-fail 10.6 — — 21.8 — —
Other 13.8 10.8 9.4 37.7 26.1 24.6
Banks 70.8 72.0 74.9 111.3 112.8 117.8
Rural 68.3 64.5 61.4 .3 1.5 2.1
Urban 2.4 7.5 13.6 110.9 111.3 115.8
Total 95.1 82.8 84.3 170.8 138.9 142.4
Percent of total
Thrifts 26 13 11 35 19 17
Soon-to-fail 11——1 3——
Other 15 13 11 22 19 17
Banks 74 87 89 65 81 83
Rural 72 78 73*11
Urban 2 9 16 65 80 81
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
*Less than 0.5 percent.
Note: Rural (urban) banks are banks headquartered in rural (urban) markets. Data are for midyear and exclude Casper,
Wyoming, and Ottawa, Kansas (see text).
Source: Summary of Deposits.deposit growth exceeded urban deposit growth
intheearly1990s,althoughruraldepositgrowth




its versus 26 percent of rural deposits (Table 3).
As a result, the thrift crisis should have had an
even more adverse impact on urban deposit
growththanruraldepositgrowth,accountingfor
some of the difference in the two growth rates
during the first half of the 1990s.
Totestthishypothesis,theapproachusedear-
lier to test whether rural deposits grew faster
than urban deposits was repeated using thrift
deposits as an additional factor to explain deposit
growth. Specifically, the regression equation
reported in the last row of Table 2 was re-
estimated including the 1989 deposit shares of
soon-to-fail and healthy thrifts in addition to
income growth. As shown in Table 4, using




Thus, when thrift effects are taken into account,
ruraldepositgrowthdoesnotcompareasfavora-
blywithurbangrowthbutstilldoesnotlookany
weaker than urban deposit growth.
On balance, then, the results of this section
support the view that rural investors have been
shifting out of deposits into mutual funds and
other financial instruments, adding to funding
pressuresatruralbanks.Asintheprevioussection,
however, the results do not suggest that these
funding pressures are greater for rural banks
thanforurbanbanksofcomparablesize.Specifi-
cally,depositgrowthturnsouttohavebeenjustas
sluggish in urban markets as in rural markets,
even after accounting for differences in eco-
nomicgrowthandtheimpactofthethriftcrisis.
While reassuring, the fact that rural deposit
growth has compared favorably with urban
deposit growth until now does not mean it will
continuetodoso.In1996,bankandthriftdepos-
its were 66 percent of personal income in rural
markets but only 45 percent of personal income
in urban markets. This gap in deposit-income
ratios suggest that despite increased access to
mutual funds products and other financial
instruments,ruralinvestorsarestillmorewilling
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Table 4
ESTIMATED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN
DEPOSIT GROWTH, 1989-94
Controlling for income growth and thrift crisis
(percentage points)
Effect of income growth
Effect of deposits in
healthy thrifts
Effect of deposits in
soon-to-fail thrifts
Gap between rural and
urban deposit growth
.5** -.06* -.19** .5
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
Note:Sampleconsistsof25MSAsand31ruraleconomicareas,witheachareagivenequalweight.Thriftdepositshares
are for the beginning of the period.to hold deposits than urban investors. If rural
investorsbegantobehavemorelikeurbaninves-
tors and the rural deposit-income ratio moved
even part way toward the urban deposit-income
ratio,ruraldepositgrowthcouldfallwellbelow
urban deposit growth. Furthermore, while the
aging of the rural population and the associated
transfer of wealth to younger generations have
hadnodiscernibleeffectonruraldepositgrowth
todate,thefulleffectsofthisdemographicshift
may not have been felt yet.
III.INCREASED TAKEOVERS OF
RURAL BANKS
The third source of concern about funding
pressures at rural banks is the increased rate of
mergers between rural and urban banks. Some
analysts argue that urban banks are taking large
amounts of deposits through their newly
acquiredruralbranchesandinvestingthedepos-
itsoutsidethecommunity.Asaresult,remaining
rural banks are being called on to make more
loans to local borrowers without experiencing
any increase in loanable funds. Other analysts
disagree that takeovers increase funding pres-
sures at remaining rural banks, arguing that
urban banks will maintain lending to rural bor-
rowers as long as the loans are profitable.
What are the issues?
Several factors have led to a high rate of
mergers between rural and urban banks in the
district during the 1990s. First, district states
have significantly relaxed restrictions on state-
wide branching, giving urban banks much
greater freedom to take over rural banks and
convertthemtobranches.Inthefirsthalfofthe
1980s, no district state allowed banks to own
branches through the state. These restrictions
began to be relaxed in the second half of the
1980s, and by 1991 all seven states allowed
statewide branching through acquisition.
12 Sec-
ond,thehighrateofruralbankfailuresduring
the agricultural crisis of the 1980s underscored
therisksofspecializinginloanstiedtothelocal
economy. One way banks could diversify their
loan portfolios and reduce their vulnerability
to local economic downturns was to operate
branches in both rural and urban markets. Third,
increasing competition from nonbank financial
institutions and consolidation in the farm sector
mayhaveledsomeruralbankstoconcludethey
weretoosmalltomeetalltheneedsoftheircus-




bank lenders such as insurance companies and
the Farm Credit System.
Such mergers between rural and urban banks
may increase funding pressures at remaining
rural banks if the merged banks reduce lending
tocreditworthylocalborrowersandifthesebor-
rowersturntootherruralbanksforcredit.Itmay
not be feasible for the managers of a large bank
with widely dispersed operations to review every




sions, resulting in fewer loans being made to
localborrowers.Inothercases,aruralbankmay
be discouraged from making local loans after it
is taken over and converted to a branch because
the acquiring bank was mainly interested in
gaining access to low-cost deposits for invest-
mentinothermarkets.Aslongastheborrowers
who are denied loans as a result of the takeover
are creditworthy, other rural banks should be
willing to lend to them. These banks may face
increased funding pressures, however, because
theincreaseinloandemandmaynotbematched
by an increase in deposits.
Not all analysts agree that takeovers of rural
banks increase funding pressures at remaining
rural banks. One reason funding pressures at
other banks might remain unchanged is that the
banks taken over in mergers might not decrease
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over, some rural banks may have loaned only a
small percentage of their deposits because they
were worried about the risk of illiquidity. And
other banks may have limited lending to local
borrowers because they did not want to tie their
fortunes too closely to the local economy. Join-
ingalarge,geographicallydiversifiedbankwith
access to open market funds would reduce both
concerns, enabling acquired banks to invest a
higherproportionoftheirfundsinloanstolocal
borrowers.
Another reason takeovers might not increase
funding pressures is that the borrowers who
were denied loans after a merger might not be
sufficientlycreditworthyforotherruralbanksto
wanttolendtothem.Someruralbanksacquired
in mergers may have made local loans that
were only marginally profitable—for example,
because the banks were not concerned about
maximizing profits and were protected from
takeover by the severe branching restrictions
that existed in most district states until the late
1980s.Ifotherruralbankshadnointerestintak-
ing on such marginally profitable loans, their
need for funds would not increase.
Finally, even if takeovers resulted in credit-
worthy borrowers being denied loans, funding
pressures at other rural banks could remain
unchangedbecausethebanksacquiredinmerg-
ers lost just as many depositors as loan custom-
ers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
depositorsprefertodobusinesswithsmalllocal
banks because they offer more personalized
serviceandhaveclosertiestothelocalcommu-
nity. Also, mergers sometimes cause temporary
disruptionsinserviceduetodifficultiesincom-
biningcomputersystemsorestablishingreport-
ing relationships. If such factors caused a
substantial outflow of deposits from banks
acquiredinmergers,otherruralbankscouldfind
themselveswithmorethanenoughfundstosat-
isfy their increased loan demand.
How important have takeovers of rural
banks been?
Depositsinruralbranchesofurbanbankshave
increased significantly during the 1990s (Table
3). In mid-1989, the rural deposits of urban
banks totaled only $2.4 billion (1997 dollars).
Over the next eight years, such deposits
increased more than fivefold to $13.6 billion.
Becausetotalruraldepositsfellduringthisperiod,
the rural deposit share of urban banks rose even
more sharply, from 2 percent to 16 percent.
Table5showsthattheincreaseinruraldepos-
its of urban banks has come entirely through
takeovers of rural banks and not through the
opening of new branches or deposit growth at
previously existing branches. Over the eight-
year period, urban banks acquired $11.7 billion in
depositsthroughmergerswithruralbanks.That
figureexceededthetotalchangeinruraldeposits
of urban banks by $0.5 billion, suggesting that
ruralbankstakenoverbyurbanbankssuffereda
net decline in deposits following the merger.
The table also shows that mergers between
ruralandurbanbankshavenotabatedduringthe
lastseveralyears.Inthefirsthalfofthe1990s,an
average of $1.0 billion in rural deposits was
acquiredbyurbanbankseachyearthroughtake-
oversofruralbanks.Duringthenextthreeyears,
rural deposits acquired through mergers aver-
aged an even higher $2.2 billion per year. Thus,
despite the widely publicized decision by some
large interstate banking organizations to with-
drawfromruralmarkets,otherurbanbankshave
remainedsufficientlyinterestedinruralacquisi-
tions to sustain the rate of takeovers.
Have the takeovers increased funding
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after it is merged into another bank and con-
verted to a branch.
14 Furthermore, to establish
that takeovers increase funding pressures at
other rural banks, it is not enough to show that









than the supply of funds.
Analternativeapproachistofocusonloanand
depositgrowthatruralbanksthathaveremained
independent, comparing banks in markets with
high takeovers to banks in markets with low take-
overs.Iftakeoversofruralbankshaveincreased
funding pressures on remaining rural banks,
then loan growth should be observed to have
exceeded deposit growth by a bigger margin at
banks in markets with high takeovers than at
banksinmarketswithlowtakeovers.Inmaking
such a comparison, it is important to control for
other factors that could cause loan and deposit
growthtodifferacrossbanks.Onesuchfactoris
the amount of deposits acquired by the bank
from thrifts through deposit transfers, mergers, or
branch purchases.Anotherfactoriswhetherthe
markets in which the bank operated experienced
sloworrapideconomicgrowthovertheperiod.
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Table 5
CHANGE IN REAL RURAL DEPOSITS
Tenth District states
(billions of 1997 dollars)










1990 .9 .5 .4 1.8 -.5 2.3
1991 1.1 .7 .5 -.9 -.7 -.2
1992 1.3 1.7 -.4 -1.8 -1.7 -.2
1993 .7 .8 -.1 -1.3 -.8 -.5
1994 1.1 1.4 -.3 -1.6 -1.4 -.1
1995 3.0 2.9 .1 -2.9 -2.9 .0
1996 1.2 1.3 -.1 .5 -1.3 1.8
1997 1.9 2.4 -.5 -.7 -2.4 1.7
Total 11.1 11.7 -.5 -7.0 -11.7 4.7
*Includes changes due to relocation of bank headquarters.
Note: Changes in deposits are from June to June.
Source: Summary of Deposits.Thisapproachwasimplementedthroughregres-





bank was directly or indirectly involved. Separate
regression equations were then estimated for
loan growth and deposit growth. The variables
used to explain loan growth and deposit growth
werethetotalamountofdepositsacquiredbythe
bankfromthrifts,theaveragegrowthinpersonal
income in the bank’s markets, and the average
ratio of deposits acquired in mergers to other
depositsinthebank’smarkets.Thefirstcolumn
inTable6reportstheestimatedeffectofincome
growth, the second column the estimated effect
of thrift acquisitions, and the third column the
estimated effect of takeovers.
The regression results provide no evidence
that takeovers of rural banks by urban banks
increased funding pressures at remaining rural
banks. Specifically, the results show that take-
overs have increased loan growth and deposit
growth at surviving banks by roughly equal
amounts, leaving loan-deposit ratios unchanged.
Foreachpercentage-pointincreaseintheratio
of deposits acquired in mergers to other deposits,
loangrowthatremainingbanksincreasedbyan
average of 0.17 percentage point but deposit
growth increased by nearly the same amount.
Both effects are statistically significant, although





increased deposit growth at other rural banks
helps explain why deposit growth has been so
strongatthoseruralbanksthathaveremainedin
business. The last column of Table 5 shows that
depositsofruralbanksnottakenoverinmergers
have increased by a total of $5 billion in the
1990s, offsetting two-fifths of the decline in
ruralbankdepositsduetomergers.Someofthis
deposit growth has come through thrift acquisi-
tions, especially at the beginning of the decade.
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Table 6
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF TAKEOVERS ON 1989-96 LOAN
AND DEPOSIT GROWTH







Loan growth 1.1** .69** .17**
Deposit growth 1.2** .57** .16**
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
Note:Sampleconsistsof1,316banksheadquarteredinruralareasinJune1996.Loananddepositgrowthareadjustedfor
bank mergers. Income growth is the weighted-average growth of personal income in the bank’s deposit markets. Thrift
acquisitionsaretotaldepositsacquiredbythebankfromthriftsasapercentageofthebank’sinitialdeposits.Takeovers
are the weighted-average ratio of deposits taken over to deposits not taken over in the bank’s markets, expressed as a
percent.Theregressionestimatessuggest,however,that
some of the growth has also come from rural
banksoutcompetingtheruralbranchesofurban
banks for deposits.
In short, while takeovers of rural banks have
increased significantly, the evidence does not
suggest mergers have increased funding pres-
sures at other rural banks. Takeovers do appear
to have increased loan growth at other rural
banks, consistent with the claim that banks
acquired in mergers make fewer loans to local
borrowers. But takeovers also appear to have
boosteddepositgrowthatotherruralbanks,con-
sistent with anecdotal evidence that some deposi-
torsprefertodobusinesswithlocalbanks.Thus,
to date, the net effect of takeovers has been to
leave funding pressures essentially unchanged.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Thisarticlehasexaminedthreesourcesofcon-
cern about funding pressures at rural banks
—the increase in loan-deposit ratios, the slug-
gishgrowthindeposits,andtheincreasedrateof
takeovers of rural banks by urban banks. Over-
all,theevidencesuggeststhatfundingpressures
have increased at rural banks but not any more
than at urban banks of the same size.
The available evidence does not support the
view that takeovers of rural banks have increased
funding pressures at other rural banks. Take-
oversdoappeartohaveincreasedloangrowthat
remaining rural banks. But these banks have
gainedjustasmanynewdepositorsasnewloan
customers,leavingfundingpressuresunchanged.
Evidence on loan-deposit ratios is more mixed.
Loan-deposit ratios have risen sharply at rural
banks during the last several years, consistent
with the view that rural banks face increased
funding pressures. Some of the increase in the
loan-depositratioappearstobecyclical,however,
and some represents a return to normal levels
after the precipitous decline in rural lending in the
1980s.Also,surveyevidencesuggeststhatrural
banks are not as uncomfortable with high loan-
depositratiosnowastheywereinthelate1970s.
The strongest support for the view that rural
banks face increased funding pressures comes
fromthesluggishnessinruraldepositgrowth.If
this sluggishness were due to weak economic
growthorthethriftcrisis,therewouldbenorea-
son to expect rural banks to have a harder time
funding their loans. The article finds, however,
that rural deposit growth was quite weak even
aftercontrollingforthesefactors.Thus,theevi-
dencesupportstheviewthatruralinvestorshave
been shifting out of deposits into mutual funds,
forcing rural banks to finance their lending in
other ways.
While this article finds some evidence of
increasedfundingpressuresatruralbanks,those
pressures do not appear to be unique to rural
banks. Loan-deposit ratios have not risen any
moreatruralbanksthanaturbanbanksofsimilar
size, and deposit growth has been just as slug-
gish in urban markets as in rural markets. Thus,
the evidence does not support the view that
increased access to mutual funds and an aging
population have caused rural deposit growth to
slow more than urban deposit growth, creating
greaterfundingpressuresforruralbanksthanfor
urban banks of similar size. The article noted,





tors, rural deposit growth could fall behind
urbandepositgrowth,causingfundingpressures
to become more severe for rural banks than
similar-size urban banks.
The fact that small banks in both rural and
urban markets face funding pressures due to
weak deposit growth provides some support for
considering measures to improve access of small
banks to open market funds. Small banks have
60 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtraditionallyenjoyedlessaccesstoopenmarket
credit than large banks because creditors do not
have as much information about their under-
lying financial condition. Measures aimed at
narrowingthisinformationgapcouldhelpsmall
banks compensate for the slowdown in deposit
growth and maintain their lending.
Whether there is any justification for policies
targetedatruralbanksislessclear.Thefactthat
small rural banks face the same funding pres-
suresassmallurbanbankswouldseemtoargue
against policies aimed specifically at rural banks.
Such a conclusion may be unwarranted, how-
ever,becausesmallbusinessesaremoredepend-
ent on community banks for credit in rural
marketsthanurbanmarkets.Asmallurbanbusi-
ness that cannot get a loan at a small bank
becausethebankfacesseverefundingpressures
may be able to turn to a large bank or nonbank
financialinstitution.Asmallruralbusinessmay
not have this option, because other local banks
face just as severe funding pressures as the bank
that turned down the loan and because nonbank
financial institutions often do not serve rural
markets.
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APPENDIX
This appendix provides further details on
the regression equations estimated in the
article. Table 2 reports estimates of the dif-
ference between rural and urban deposit
growth during different subperiods after
controlling for income growth. These esti-
mates were obtained by estimating the fol-
lowing regression equation, the results for
which are reported in Table A1:
GDEP a b GINC mt t t mt =+
+= c RURAL t t m 123 ,,.
GDEPmt isaverageannualpercentgrowthin
real deposits in market m over subperiod t;
GINC mt isaverageannualpercentgrowthin
realpersonalincomeinmarket m oversub-
period t; and RURALm is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if market m is rural. Deposits and
personalincomeforeachyearweredeflated
by the CPI excluding food and energy. The
threesubperiodsforwhichtheequationwas




definitions are based on Component Eco-
nomic Areas (CEAs), the geographic unit
used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Most CEAs are centered around a metro-
politan statistical area (MSA) and include
both urban and rural counties. However,
some CEAs include only urban counties,
(1)
Table A1
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR EQUATION (1)























Note: Absolute value of t-statistic is in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
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while others include only rural counties.
Eachrural(urban)marketinthesamplecon-
sistsofacollectionofrural(urban)counties
in a CEAthat lies mainly inside the district.
InthosefewcasesinwhichtheCEAextends
outsidethedistrict,onlydistrictcountiesare
included. Also, a few district counties are
omitted from the sample because they
belong to CEAs lying mainly outside the
district.
Onpage53,thearticlereportsestimatesof
the relationship between rural deposit
growth and beginning-of-period thrift
deposit shares for the subperiod 1989-94.
These estimates were obtained by estimat-
ing the following regression equation, the
results for which are reported in Table A2:
DDEP a bDINC mm =+




income in market m from 1989 to 1994;
FTDEP m 89 is the percent of mid-1989
depositsin market mheldinofficesofsoon-
to-fail thrifts (thrifts closed by the RTC over
the next five years); and HTDEP m 89 is the
percent of mid-1989 deposits in market m




Table 4 reports an estimate of the differ-
ence between rural and urban deposit
growth over the subperiod 1989-94 after
controlling for thrift effects as well as
income growth. This estimate was obtained
by estimating the following variation on
equation (1), the results for which are
reported in Table A3:
GDEP a bGINC cFTDEP mm m =+ + 89
++ d HTDEP eRURAL mm 89 .
GDEPm andGINC m aredefinedasinequa-
tion(1),whileFTDEP m 89 andHTDEP m 89
aredefinedasinequation(2).Asinequa-
tion (1), the sample consists of 25 urban




ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR EQUATION (2)











Note: Absolute value of t-statistic is in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Finally, Table 5 reports estimates of the
impact of takeovers of rural banks on loan
anddepositgrowthatremainingruralbanks,
controlling for both thrift acquisitions and
local income growth. These estimates were
obtained by estimating the following equa-
tions, the results for which are reported in
Table A4:
DDEP a bTHRIFTDEP =+
++ cDINC dTA E ER
DL AN a bTHRIFTDEP =+
++ cDINC dTA E ER .
DDEP and DL AN are the percent
changes in nominal deposits and nominal
loansatbank frommid-1989tomid-1996,
ad usted for acquisitions of other banks.
Thesevariableswerecalculatedbydividing
the 1996 deposits and loans of bank by the
1989 deposits and loans of bank and of all
banks directly or indirectly acquired by
bank during the seven-year period.
THRIFTDEP is the total amount of thrift
deposits directly or indirectly acquired by
bank over the period, expressed as a per-
centofthe1989depositsofbank andofall
banks directly or indirectly acquired by
bank . DINC is average income growth in
the markets in which bank operated, and
TA E ER isameasureofaveragetake-















where DINC m is the percent change in
nominal personal income in market m from
1989to1996; isthefractionofthe1989
depositsofbank andofallbanksdirectlyor
indirectly acquired by bank that were held
in market m; RUDEP m 89 is the total 1989
depositsheldinmarketmbyruralbanksthat
Table A3.
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR EQUATION (3)













Note: Absolute value of t-statistic is in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5 percent level
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
(4) (6)
(7)
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were directly or indirectly taken over by
urbanbanksduringthenextsevenyears;and
RRDEP m 89 isthetotal1989depositsheldin
marketmbyruralbanksthatwerenottaken
over by urban banks during the next seven
years. The sample for equations (4) and (5)
consists of 1,316 banks headquartered in
rural counties in mid-1996.
Table A4
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR EQUATIONS (4) AND (5)




















Note: Absolute value of t-statistic is in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.ENDNOTES
1 Rural banks are defined as those headquartered in rural
markets and urban banks as those headquartered in urban
markets. As will be discussed in detail later, some urban
bankshaveruralbranchesandsomeruralbankshaveurban
branches.
2 The three size categories are less than $100 million in
assets, $100 million to $300 million in assets, and $300
million to $1 billion in assets (1997 dollars). In mid-1997,
59 percent of the total deposits of rural banks were in the
first size category, 26 percent in the second size category,
and 15 percent in the third size category.
3 Surveys of agricultural credit practices by other Federal
Reserve Banks have obtained similar responses (U.S.
Department of Agriculture).
4Accordingtoanationalsurveyofsmallbusinessfinances
by the Board of Governors, a third of small businesses in
urban areas used financial services from nondepository
financial institutions versus a fifth of small businesses in
rural areas (Cole and Wolken). Farmers may not be as
adversely affected by funding pressures at rural banks as
small businesses because farmers can borrow from
government-sponsoredenterprisessuchastheFarmCredit
System.
5 The data in this article exclude Casper, Wyoming, and
Ottawa,Kansasbecauseofextremefluctuationsindeposits
at a large thrift headquartered in Ottawa and a large
interstate bank headquartered in Casper.
6 Some of the surge in deposit growth in 1983 was due to
theintroductionofmoneymarketdepositaccounts,which
allowed banks and thrifts to compete more effectively
with money market mutual funds.
7 Each rural market consists of all rural counties in a
Component Economic Area, the geographic unit used by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Each urban market is a
metropolitan statistical area (MSA).
8 All regressions estimated in this article are explained in
greater detail in the appendix.
9Banksacquired$18billionindepositsfromfailedthrifts
and $6 billion from healthy thrifts, out of a total decline in
thrift deposits of $47 billion. Data are unavailable at the
branch level on the amounts of thrift deposits acquired by
banks,makingitimpossibletoseparateoutacquisitionsof
rural thrift deposits from acquisitions of urban thrift
deposits.
10Anotherreasonthe$7billionfiguremightunderstatethe
deposit loss is that depositors of insolvent thrifts often
received a lower interest rate when their funds were
transferredtoahealthybank.Thechangeintermsmayhave
caused some of these depositors to reassess their
investmentalternativesandshiftoutofdepositsintomutual
funds or other financial instruments.
11 The sample consisted of 434 counties. All estimated
coefficients were statistically significant at the 1 percent
level, and the R2 for the regression was 0.28.
12Nebraska allowed statewide branching in 1985, Kansas
in 1987, Oklahoma and Wyoming in 1988, Missouri in
1990,andColoradoandNewMexicoin1991.Somestates
still restrict de novo branching.
13 Most of these studies have focused on the impact of
mergersonsmallbusinessloans.Forarecentreviewofthe
literature, see Board of Governors.
14 This problem is especially acute when a small bank is
taken over by a much larger bank, because any change in
lending at the new branch will be swamped in the data by
changes in lending at the acquiring bank’s other offices.
15 The R2 was .05 for the loan equation and .14 for the
deposit equation. While low, these figures are not unusual
for such regressions.
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